Colombia’s Election: A Geopolitical Outlook

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Colombia approaches another presidential election on May the 31st, the feeling many citizens experience is not necessarily optimism, but exhaustion. Elections in the country often intensify political polarization, aggressive campaigning, misinformation across social media, and heightened violence. The result is an atmosphere of uncertainty and tension in which many voters feel  unconvinced by what is being proposed. 

This article, however, is not intended to analyze the election from a domestic political perspective. Instead, it seeks to examine the broader geopolitical outlook of what has been in order to draw comparisons and understand Colombia's geopolitical future paths. 

Any geopolitical analysis of Colombia ultimately revolves around three interconnected dimensions: economics, diplomacy, and security. Across all three, one actor remains present: The United States. It remains Colombia’s largest trading partner, absorbing about 30% of Colombian exports. It is also the country’s largest source of foreign direct investment, with U.S. companies accounting for approximately 32% of the total FDI in annual investment flows in recent years. Therefore, Colombia’s geopolitical outlook cannot be separated from the evolution of its relationship with the United States across these three dimensions 

Colombia’s Historical Alignment with Washington

For decades, Colombia was one of Washington’s closest partners in the region. The relationship included security cooperation, anti-narcotics operations, intelligence sharing, trade agreements, and initiatives such as Plan Colombia which made Bogota a central in American strategic calculations. 

This relationship was strategic for both sides. For Washington, Colombia represented a stable pro-American partner in an environment often marked by anti-U.S. governments. During the presidencies of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and other left-wing movements across Latin America during the 2000s, Colombia remained a geopolitical trusted counterweight.

For Colombia, the partnership brought military assistance, intelligence capabilities, foreign investment, and diplomatic support at a time when the country was facing some of the worst episodes of violence in its modern history. This relationship reached its highest point with Plan Colombia (1999 - 2016), launched in 1999 under Presidents Andrés Pastrana and Bill Clinton, it became the strongest security partnership in the hemisphere. The US provided Colombia with more than $10 billion in military, counternarcotics, and institutional assistance to help modernize Colombian security forces. 

The relationship deepened further with the implementation of the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement in 2012, which brought deeper economic integration. The agreement expanded bilateral trade and strengthened U.S. investment in industries such as energy, finance, infrastructure, and manufacturing. Geopolitically, the FTA (free trade agreement) reinforced Colombia’s position in an economic architecture that was more U.S.-aligned at a moment when several other Latin American governments were moving toward more protectionist models. 

The Petro Shift 

The election of President Gustavo Petro in June 2022 marked one of the most significant geopolitical shifts. Being the country’s first left-wing president, Petro introduced a more autonomous foreign policy approach centered around regional integration, diversification, and reduced dependence on Washington.

One of the clearest changes came through the normalization of relations with Venezuela after years of diplomatic rupture. In September 2022, Petro formally reopened the Colombia-Venezuela border and restored diplomatic ties with Caracas after the previous government of Ivan Duque had been supporting the US led effort of isolating Nicolas Maduro. 

Petro’s presidency also coincided with the so-called second “Pink Tide”, a reconfiguration of the political landscape in Latin America marked by the return of left-leaning governments such as Lula da Silva in Brazil, Gabriel Boric in Chile, and Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico, different in ideology and economic policy, but with shared a broader emphasis on regional integration, autonomy, and reducing dependence on Washington.

As a result of this ideological alignment Petro strengthened coordination with Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil on issues like Amazon protection and climate diplomacy and regional integration and South American cooperation. Both governments emphasized the need for Latin America to adopt a more independent international posture in an increasingly multipolar world.

The Petro administration also introduced significant economic reforms that altered perceptions among international investors. In late 2022, Congress approved a major tax reform increasing taxation on extractive industries such as oil, coal, and mining sectors in which many foreign, companies, including American, have important investments. These taxes were promoted as mechanisms to finance social spending and reduce inequality, but they also generated concerns regarding long-term investment stability.

At the same time, Petro’s emphasis on accelerating the transition away from fossil fuel dependency introduced additional uncertainty into Colombia’s energy sector. His government announced it would not approve new oil and gas exploration contracts despite hydrocarbons representing about 40% of Colombian exports and a major source of revenue for the state. Foreign direct investment in extractive sectors weakened and overall economic growth slowed. After expanding by 7.3% in 2022, Colombia’s GDP growth slowed to between roughly 0.6% and 1.7% in 2023 according to different estimates.

Diplomatically, Petro also pursued a more diversified international strategy. In 2025, Colombia joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative and entered the BRICS New Development Bank, moves that symbolized Colombia’s willingness to diversify economic and diplomatic partnerships beyond its traditional Western orientation. Although these initiatives did not immediately transform trade patterns, they deepened Chinese strategic access to infrastructure, energy transition projects, and financing opportunities in one of Washington’s closest historical partners in Latin America.

For Washington, these developments reflected a broader geopolitical challenge taking place across the region: the gradual expansion of Chinese economic and political influence in a hemisphere historically dominated by the United States.

Due to the factors mentioned above among others, tensions between both countries gradually intensified. Washington revoked Petro’s U.S. visa in late 2025, imposed sanctions on Colombian officials, threatened reductions in financial assistance, and repeatedly accused the Colombian government of failing to contain coca production and regional instability. The situation escalated even more following the 2026 intervention in Venezuela and the collapse of Nicolás Maduro’s government. Petro strongly criticized the operation while the Trump administration increasingly questioned Colombia’s counternarcotics strategy and the effectiveness of Petro’s “Total Peace” doctrine. At some point Trump even openly suggested that military action against Colombia “sounds good to me” when questioned about possible intervention, while also hinting at airstrikes and stronger operations against trafficking networks in the region. 

Security Beyond Colombia’s Borders

The latter brings us to instability inside Colombia, which can hardly be contained within its borders, affecting migration routes, drug trafficking corridors, and security dynamics.

Under Petro’s “Total Peace” strategy, the government prioritized negotiations with criminal groups, and a less militarized approach toward coca cultivation which differed from previous approaches with the idea to address the structural economic conditions driving coca production in rural communities.

The results, however, have been deeply controversial. By 2024 and 2025, Colombia’s coca cultivation exceeded 250,000 hectares, more than double the levels recorded during some of the most intense years of Plan Colombia back in the 2000s. Potential cocaine production surpassed 2,600 tons annually, which is the highest figure ever recorded highlighting the gap between state efforts and the expanding scale of narcotics production. 

At the same time, armed organizations such as ELN, FARC dissident groups, and the Gulf Clan continued expanding territorial influence across strategically important regions including border areas with Venezuela, coca-producing corridors in the southwest, and important Pacific trafficking routes. In several rural departments, the Colombian state increasingly struggled to maintain effective control, allowing illegal groups to impose extortion systems, recruit local populations, regulate illicit economies, and challenge state authority. Despite ongoing negotiations under Petro’s “Total Peace” strategy, massacres, attacks against social leaders, forced displacement, and rural violence remained persistent features of the security landscape. 

These dynamics have had direct regional consequences. Ecuador, for example, has experienced a dramatic deterioration in security conditions in recent years, partly linked to the expansion of regional trafficking networks and the growing operational reach of transnational criminal organizations connected to Colombian cocaine routes. Panama continues struggling with migration flows through the Darién Gap, while border regions with Venezuela remain vulnerable to the activities of armed groups and smuggling networks.

All in all, Colombia has historically functioned as a regional security anchor and one of the principal anti-narcotics partners of the United States. That is why a weakening Colombian security environment complicates broader areas related to migration, organized crime, and regional stability.

Competing Geopolitical Paths 

In the upcoming presidential elections we can see a competition between two distinct political and geopolitical models that is taking place along the continent. On one side are governments advocating greater strategic autonomy, stronger regional integration, and diversification away from dependence on Washington. On the other are leaders emphasizing security, market-oriented reforms, and closer alignment with western institutions.

If voting determines a continuation of Petro-aligned policies under left-wing candidate Iván Cepeda would likely reinforce Colombia’s current trajectory towards autonomy, stronger engagement with China and regional left-wing governments, and a less predictable relationship with Washington. 

A victory by right wing candidates Paloma Valencia or Abelardo de la Espriella would likely signal a return towards a familiar approach: more alignment with the United States, particularly regarding security cooperation, the restoration of more aggressive anti-drug policies, a confrontational approach toward criminal organizations  and renewed efforts to attract foreign investment into Colombia’s energy and infrastructure sectors.