Second-hand submarines: the compromise that redraws AUKUS

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Originally signed in September 2021 to equip Australia with nuclear-powered submarines, the AUKUS agreement is once again evolving, this time in favour of delivering second-hand vessels to Canberra. On 31 May 2026, the three actors — the United States, United Kingdom and Australia — agreed on the revision of the optimal pathway, during the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, shifting from two second-hand and one newly built submarines to three second-hand submarines. While this change is intended to accelerate deliveries to Australia, it also raises a series of important questions.

Despite the appearance of alliance cohesion, the AUKUS agreement has failed to secure broad public support from the Australian population, where repeated delays have fuelled growing scepticism, despite the country being the main beneficiary of the deal. Even though the revision of the project was presented as cost effective by Australia’s Defence Minister, the expenditures of the project have also seriously increased due to operational and training costs. It is also important to note that the agreement also raises concerns within the region, due to the possibility of an increased Sino-American competition in the Indo-Pacific.

An Industrial and operational compromise:

Initially designed to answer the need for Canberra to renew its aging fleet, the redefinition of the agreement answers first and foremost to the calendar constraint, as Australia requires new submarines before its vessels become obsolete. In The meantime, American shipyards lack the capacity to deliver newly built submarines on time though investments are important. Meanwhile, most of its production capacity is turned towards the US itself, in what could be seen as a race for naval power with China, that have become a new maritime superpower over the past decade.  

Additionally, the presence of American submarines also answers the necessity to train quickly soldiers able to handle the technologies of such vessels. Simultaneously, the Australian Submarine Agency’s budget exploded while Canberra also secured important investments in its own shipyards. Therefore, the AUKUS agreement, already costly for the Australian government that withdrew from a previous deal with the French naval industry, pushes further Canberra’s expenses, while no submarines have been delivered yet.

A geopolitical signal addressed to Beijing:

As previously mentioned, even though the AUKUS agreement seems so far more expensive than expected — while providing second-hand submarines and not new ones — the message sent by the US appears significant. Indeed, Washington is concerned by China’s maritime expansion in the region, thus pushing it to act quicker to improve a US-led security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. Along with material deliveries, the US also provides Australia with technologies, training and the capability to reinforce its own fleet through the improvement of its shipyards, marking AUKUS’ impact in the long-term.

Although the redefinition of the AUKUS agreement faced criticism, it is also important to note that the US have been able to maintain this deal together with the UK and Australia, demonstrating the full strategic commitment of the three actors. Nevertheless, this strategy also carries the risk of a never-ending escalation of maritime competition in the region. Therefore, AUKUS could also illustrate a paradox of deterrence: what is presented on one side as a power balancing tool may also intensify the rivalry it seeks to contain.

Conclusion:

Finally, the redefinition of the AUKUS agreement does not mark the end of the program, but rather its reconfiguration under pressure. While China’s navy is now the largest fleet in the world, the American industry is confronted with the limits of its industrial capacity, which seems to have forced the revision of the agreement. Ultimately, the significance of AUKUS lies less in the age of the submarines delivered rather than in the strategic architecture they are meant to create. Whether the pact will succeed balancing powers in the Indo-Pacific will depend not only on the delivery of submarines, but also on the capacity of the alliance to maintain its cohesion and a serious industrial capability, facing a rising China.