Why Taiwanese Students Make a Pilgrimage From the Embassy to the Holy See

ROC's embassy to the Holy See near Vatican city. Photo credit: Phoebe Chow

I first learnt of this curious itinerary from Taiwanese friends—students, expatriates, and travelers—who told me that a visit to the Republic of China's Embassy to the Holy See had become an almost obligatory stop on any trip to Rome. They were not there to renew passports or seek consular assistance. Instead, they would press the door bell, request to visit the embassy's library, use its facilities, attend an event if one happened to be taking place, or simply take photographs outside a building where the flag of the Republic of China flies openly on the street.

In a world where many of Taiwan's overseas missions have been renamed as "Taipei Economic and Cultural Offices" to accommodate diplomatic sensitivities, the embassy's continued existence offers something increasingly rare: a place in Europe where the Republic of China's flag still flies above an embassy recognised by another sovereign state.

To an outsider, this ritual can seem puzzling. Why would the Taiwanese make a pilgrimage to an embassy?

The answer has little to do with bureaucracy and everything to do with geopolitics.

That quiet building, tucked away near Vatican City, is more than an embassy. It is one of the last surviving physical reminders of Taiwan's formal diplomatic recognition in Europe. It represents a relationship that has endured despite dramatic shifts in global politics, the rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC), and decades of Beijing's diplomatic campaign to reduce Taiwan's international space.

If embassies no longer determine military power or economic wealth, why do states devote immense diplomatic resources to opening, maintaining—or forcing the closure of—them?

Embassies exist because two sovereign entities have chosen to recognise one another as legitimate participants in international society. An embassy is therefore not merely a building occupied by diplomats; it is the institutional expression of diplomatic recognition.

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961), defines the functions of diplomatic missions as representing the sending state, protecting its interests, negotiating with the receiving state, and promoting friendly relations between governments. Diplomatic missions do not create sovereignty; they presuppose it.

Similarly, Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933) identifies the "capacity to enter into relations with other states" as one of the classic criteria of statehood. Although international lawyers continue to debate whether recognition is constitutive or merely declaratory of statehood, diplomatic relations remain one of the clearest outward manifestations that a political entity has been accepted as a member of international society. Recognition, in other words, is not simply symbolic but institutional.

Neumann (2015) argues that diplomatic sites should not be understood merely as workplaces but as spaces where international politics is continuously performed. Embassies materialise sovereignty. They make recognition visible. Thus Taiwan's embassy to the Holy See matters.

The Holy See’s Unusual Diplomatic Identity

Measured by conventional indicators of national power, the Holy See should occupy only a marginal position in world politics. It governs fewer than 1000 residents, commands no meaningful military capability, and exerts little direct economic influence.

Yet it maintains one of the world's oldest diplomatic services and formal relations with more than 180 states. Unlike most sovereign entities, the Holy See's international influence derives not from material resources but from moral authority, historical continuity, and its leadership of approximately 1.4 billion Catholics worldwide.

States establish relations not with the Vatican City State but with the Holy See—the central governing authority of the Catholic Church. International law recognises the Holy See as possessing a distinct international legal personality that predates the creation of Vatican City in 1929.

The recognition from the Holy See symbolises one of the oldest diplomatic institutions in the international system.

In that respect, Taiwan's embassy to the Holy See is the story of how recognition itself became a geopolitical battleground.

Unlike most of Taiwan's remaining diplomatic partners, the Holy See does not recognise Taipei because of economic dependence, security guarantees, or development assistance. Unlike many countries that have switched diplomatic recognition after weighing the aforementioned opportunities, , the Holy See's relationship with Taiwan has been shaped by questions of religious freedom, ecclesiastical authority, and the governance of the Catholic Church in China.

The Holy See established diplomatic relations with the Republic of China in 1942, during the Second World War, when Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government remained internationally recognised as the legitimate government of China. When the Chinese Communist Party emerged victorious in the Civil War in 1949, most governments eventually transferred diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. The Holy See did not.

This decision was partly shaped by Cold War politics, but it also reflected the rapid deterioration of relations between the new Communist government and the Catholic Church.

During the 1950s, foreign missionaries were expelled, Church property was confiscated, and diplomatic relations effectively ceased. The Apostolic Internuncio left mainland China in 1951 and subsequently relocated to Taiwan.

More fundamentally, however, the dispute centered upon authority. The Catholic Church is a transnational institution. Bishops are appointed under the authority of the Pope, and ecclesiastical governance ultimately derives from Rome rather than national governments.

For the Chinese Communist Party, this posed a fundamental political problem. No organisation operating within China could ultimately owe allegiance to a foreign authority. The dispute that began in the early years of the People's Republic has always been about sovereignty.

Religious Sovereignty Vs Political Sovereignty

The Chinese Communist Party maintains that all organisations operating within China—including religious communities—must ultimately submit to state authority. This principle has become increasingly explicit under Xi Jinping. PRC’s 5 star flags stand on top of the Potala Palace in Lhasa and various Buddhist temples. The significant domes of mosques are removed to look more “Chinese”.

Official policy now emphasises the "Sinicization of religion", requiring religious organisations to align themselves with socialist values, national identity, and the leadership of the Communist Party. The State Council's White Papers on religious affairs repeatedly frame religion as a matter of national security, social stability, and resistance to foreign interference.

For the Holy See, however, the Catholic Church is universal by definition. While Catholics are expected to respect civil authority, the appointment of bishops and the governance of the Church ultimately belong to the Pope. Here is where political sovereignty and spiritual sovereignty collide.

The Bishop Question

No issue illustrates this conflict more clearly than the appointment of bishops. Following the breakdown of relations in the 1950s, China established the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA), which oversees the officially recognised Catholic Church under state supervision.

For decades, bishops appointed through state structures were often not recognised by Rome, while bishops appointed secretly with papal approval frequently lacked official recognition from Beijing.

This produced the unusual situation of two overlapping Catholic communities. The "official" Church operated legally under state supervision. The "underground" Church remained loyal to the Pope while existing outside official structures.

The result was not a theological disagreement but an institutional one. Who possessed the authority to appoint successors to the Apostles? The Communist Party? Or the Bishop of Rome?

The Holy See and Beijing reached a Provisional Agreement on the Appointment of Bishops in September 2018. Although the text has never been made public, the agreement is widely understood to establish a consultative process under which Chinese authorities participate in selecting bishops while the Pope retains the final decision regarding canonical appointment. The agreement has since been renewed several times.

Cardinal Joseph Zen: Hong Kong's Pivotal Role

Discussions of China–Holy See relations are frequently presented as a triangle involving Beijing, Taipei, and Rome. Yet this overlooks Hong Kong's historical importance.

For decades, Hong Kong served as an intermediary between mainland Chinese Catholics and the wider Catholic Church. Its seminaries, diocesan networks, charitable organisations, and relative openness made it one of the Vatican's principal windows into developments within mainland China. No individual symbolises this role more clearly than Cardinal Joseph Zen, the former Bishop of Hong Kong.

Zen emerged as perhaps the most influential internal critic of the Vatican's engagement with Beijing.

The cardinal’s criticism was not primarily geopolitical. It was ecclesiological. He argued that diplomatic rapprochement risked abandoning the underground Church, legitimising excessive state control over religion, and compromising the independence of the Catholic hierarchy.

Following his arrest in Hong Kong in 2022 under legislation related to the National Security Law, Cardinal Zen became an international symbol of concerns regarding religious freedom, civil society, and Hong Kong's changing political environment.

His position also complicated Vatican diplomacy. The Holy See found itself balancing two competing objectives: maintaining dialogue with Beijing while avoiding the perception that it had abandoned long-standing defenders of religious freedom. Hong Kong thus became more than a local issue.

The Holy See's continued recognition of Taiwan is often portrayed as a historical anomaly.

Yet it is better understood as an exception that reveals a much broader pattern in contemporary international politics.

For decades, Beijing has sought not only to expand China's diplomatic influence but also to reduce Taiwan's international visibility. While military pressure across the Taiwan Strait receives significant attention, the quieter contest over diplomatic recognition has reshaped Taiwan's presence in the international system.

Unlike wars, this competition is measured not in territory gained but in embassies opened and embassies closed.

The Shrinking Diplomatic Map of Taiwan

When the Republic of China retreated to Taiwan in 1949, many governments continued to recognise it as the legitimate government of China.

That changed dramatically after the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758 in 1971, recognising the People's Republic of China as "the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations." Although Resolution 2758 did not determine Taiwan's legal status or statehood, it fundamentally altered international diplomatic practice.

One after another, governments switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.

The pace accelerated during the past decade due to PRC’s chequebook diplomacy :

Panama recognised the PRC in 2017.

The Dominican Republic and El Salvador followed in 2018.

The Solomon Islands and Kiribati switched in 2019.

Nicaragua resumed relations with Beijing in 2021.

Honduras followed in 2023.

Currently, Taiwan has formal diplomatic relations with only 12 countries.

The evolution of the Holy See's relations with both the People's Republic of China and Taiwan has long been closely watched, as any shift could have significant implications for cross-Strait diplomacy and the international politics of recognition.

The Holy See’s diplomacy showcases the less told part of the global balance of power, that international politics is not only narrated through aircraft carriers, trade agreements, sanctions, and military alliances, but recognition.

The photograph of the Taiwanese Embassy to the Holy See has captured more than a quiet building.