After the elections in Armenia, what to expect for the broader geopolitics in the Caucasus?

Credits: Associated Press / Anthony Pizzoferrato

On 7 June 2026, Armenia renewed its National Assembly members, confirming a pro-Western course for Erevan and allowing the Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to pursue its politics in the Caucasus. Following an unprecedented mobilization of Armenia’s population — with 59% of participation — the pro-European party Civil Contract won with 49,8%, beating the pro-Russian alliance (23,3%). After 2024 contested legislative elections in Georgia and Tbilisi’s pro-Russian turn, Armenia’s elections were particularly watched from a European perspective.

Indeed, already impacted by Russian foreign involvement, the Caucasus has been a conflictual zone since the fall of the USSR. At the crossroads of Europe and Asia, and subject to Russian influence, Georgia and Armenia have demonstrated their profound will to enter the EU, while Azerbaijan has been reinforcing its diplomatic partnerships with the EU in a more pragmatic way — mainly through energy agreements.

The election’s implications for Erevan’s foreign policy:

Although the pro-Russian opposition entered the parliament with a significant political weight, the Armenian people chose continuity with Pashinyan’s politics. This renewed confidence in its approach could represent the possibility to build a momentum towards peace with Azerbaijan — given that Baku reciprocates — as well as reinforce the Caucasus’ integration with Europe. Nonetheless, this rapprochement with the EU seems also tied to Tbilisi’s position — who stopped its adhesion process — thus limiting a certain narrative of a united Caucasus and diminishing the symbolic weight of Erevan’s orientation.

Continuously, it seems that these elections gave Erevan the possibility to pursue the diversification of its partnerships, while avoiding an abrupt rupture with Moscow. Depending on Russia, Erevan could now further reinforce its ties to the EU, while reducing its dependency on the EAEU. This could also consolidate Yerevan’s democratic turn and maintain the Caucasus’ importance as a key corridor between the EU and Central Asia, which could further diminish Russia’s leverage on the region.

A reassessed geopolitical balance in the Caucasus:

The outcome of these elections, as mentioned previously, gave the opportunity for Erevan to pursue its “European dream”. Given that Russia lost a certain grip on this country —while it maintains another on Georgia — the regional environment still seems divided between the EU and Russia. Nonetheless, the reinforced partnership between Azerbaijan and the EU might also give the opportunity for the two countries to build a momentum towards deeper political and economic ties with the EU and possibly reduce their dependencies on Russia.

Additionally, given a more predictable Armenian partner, Türkiye might also grow stronger following this election. The normalization process started by between Erevan and Ankara seems likely to be reinforced, thus benefiting the regional stability and further enabling Türkiye to place itself as a key coordinator between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Conclusion:

To conclude, Armenia’s June 2026 elections don’t seem to produce a sudden geopolitical realignment but rather lock in a direction Erevan’s trajectory: a pro-Western, diversification strategy under Prime Minister Pashinyan. For the broader Caucasus, it seems that it further erodes Russian’s leverages on Erevan, while enabling deeper ties with the EU and reinforcing the normalization process between Armenia and Türkiye. Nonetheless, now that Erevan’s direction is set, it seems that the new variable is whether Baku, Ankara or other external actors can translate the outcome of this election into concrete agreements, without triggering domestic backlashes or external shocks that could reignite regional instability.