Cuban oil embargo: Who Sets the Rules in the Americas?
- Laura Tatiana Pérez Molina
- Feb 15
- 3 min read
In Havana, when the sun goes down, the city goes dark — sadly not in a metaphorical way. On January 29th, President Donald Trump signed an executive order that enforces an effective embargo on foreign oil shipments to Cuba, threatening to impose tariffs on any country supplying fuel to the island. The situation has become unbearable for the population. Some have turned to charcoal for cooking; those who have the means have installed solar panels. The situation is even more concerning for hospitals, where blackouts disrupt surgeries, oxygen systems, and the refrigeration of medicines and vaccines. Tourism, the main economic source, has been affected. Transport paralysis is disrupting food supply chains. Water shortages are also common, since pumping systems rely on fuel. The Cuban government declared emergency measures, reduced working hours, and warned of cascading disruptions across the economy.
The Executive Order
The order argues that the Cuban government constitutes an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to U.S. national security and foreign policy because of its alignment with hostile actors and its destabilizing behavior in the Western Hemisphere.
It states that Cuba supports and cooperates with governments considered adversaries, such as Russia, China, and Iran. It also provides a permissive environment for groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. It highlights Cuba’s hosting of foreign intelligence and military capabilities, mentioning what it describes as “Russia’s largest overseas signals intelligence facility” and deepening defense and intelligence cooperation with China. Additionally, the order accuses the Cuban regime of supporting terrorism, undermining regional stability through migration and security assistance to adversaries, and violating human rights domestically. It frames the regime as actively working against U.S. regional stability efforts. Based on this, Cuba is considered an “unusual and extraordinary threat,” which legally justifies the unilateral decision.
Security Concerns or Strategic Framing?
Facts show that the accusations against Cuba are not entirely unfounded. A December 2024 CSIS brief informs of at least four Cuban signals intelligence (SIGINT) facilities — Bejucal, El Salao, Wajay, and Calabazar — equipped with antennas and infrastructure capable of intercepting communications and potentially monitoring satellite launches from Florida. The report also mentions upgrades in recent years and highlights the geographic proximity to sensitive U.S. military and space facilities. It details China’s growing economic, technological, and military ties with Cuba, including telecommunications infrastructure built by Huawei and ZTE, and high-level defense engagements.
This does not conclusively prove direct Chinese operational control of Cuban intelligence sites, but it establishes a credible strategic concern. The idea of Chinese surveillance infrastructure only 145 km from Florida carries undeniable symbolic and operational weight.
However, Cuba has no meaningful conventional military capability against the United States. Its armed forces are underfunded and mostly defensive. The threat is instead indirect and primarily related to intelligence collection and political alignment with Russia and China. The jump from “strategic concern” to “extraordinary national security threat” is therefore political, not purely fact-based.
The Timing
The oil embargo did not come out of nowhere. It followed the January 2026 U.S. operation in Venezuela that resulted in the capture of Nicolás Maduro. For decades, the Havana–Caracas axis was central to Cuba’s survival. Venezuelan oil was crucial to Cuba’s electricity generation. With the fuel flow from Venezuela gone, and Washington explicitly announcing that “there will be no more oil or money going to Cuba—zero!”, Havana’s economic vulnerability was severely exposed. The tariff mechanism targeting any country supplying oil to Cuba represents a second phase of pressure: first removing the primary lifeline, and now preventing alternative suppliers.
The U.S. domestic political dimension is equally significant. Marco Rubio has built much of his political career around opposition to Cuba’s communist regime. Achieving tangible results from this move would therefore be highly meaningful for him — and perhaps even more so for President Trump. Having cultivated the image of being remembered as the one who “stopped wars” and recalibrated global conflicts, a significant shift in Cuba would represent an even more symbolic achievement. Looking ahead to the next midterms in November and eventually the presidential elections in 2028, and considering the approximately 2.5 million Cuban-Americans in the United States, a politically important community, especially in Florida, this approach toward Havana carries electoral weight as well.
Why It Matters
This matters because it signals the return of spheres of influence as an organizing principle of global politics. The oil embargo is not only about Cuba’s behavior; it affirms that there are geographic boundaries and that a great power will seek to dictate the norms within them. By threatening third countries that supply Havana with fuel, Washington is asserting that both internal and external actors cannot cross certain lines. We are witnessing a reconfiguration of the architecture of international order.
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