Europe's vulnerability to criminal networks from Latin America: undermining state's sovereignty
On 15 July 2026, German authorities dismantled a methamphetamine laboratory in Ludwigsfelde, near Berlin, arresting three Mexican nationals.. The case was one more indicator that the presence of Latin American criminal organizations in Europe are developing local operations, establishing partnerships with European criminal groups and entering new markets.
Undeniably cocaine is one of the main precursors of this expansion. It comes primarily from Colombia, Peru and Bolivia traveling through long and well established international shipping networks before reaching European ports. Once in, organizations cooperate with local criminal groups who facilitate the logistics and exploit existing commercial infrastructure. Some are even involved in synthetic-drug production and other illicit activities, extending their reach beyond the cocaine trade.
To illustrate the scale of the market we can refer to the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA) who show EU member states seized 419 tonnes of cocaine in 2023, a record at the time. Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands accounted for 72% of the total. The reported seizures fell in 2024, not necessarily because of reduced trafficking, changing routes and more diversified methods complicated the picture. It’s important to have in mind that these numbers are not the total quantity entering Europe or the volume consumed, but they demonstrate the continuing pressure on European enforcement agencies.
The appeal of the European market is not simply the existence of customers willing to buy products, it is the combination of demand, international logistics, established criminal networks and opportunities to turn illicit profits into apparently legitimate wealth. However, in this article I will not go into the complexities of how they operate.
The business exports more than drugs
The arrival of cocaine is the most visible level of a larger criminal economy. Moving drugs across borders requires access to transport networks, storage facilities, financial services and people willing, or forced, to cooperate. When these organizations get embedded in these systems, their influence extends its tentacles beyond the illicit market itself. They do more than move drugs across borders, they export what comes along with it: corruption, intimidation, illicit financial flows and pressure on the government and institutions.
Ports provide probably one of the clearest illustrations. Criminal networks seek to involve port workers, shipping personnel, customs officials or transport companies to facilitate the movement and retrieval of illicit cargo either by bribe or intimidation, same applies when they look to secure cooperation or discourage people from reporting their activity. Corruption is identified as the key facilitator of criminal activity in European ports, especially Antwerp, Rotterdam and Hamburg/Bremerhaven.
But the consequences do not stop at the port. The economic return must be transferred, concealed or reinvested. This creates demand for money laundering, shell companies, false invoicing and other financial services. Legitimate businesses can become vehicles for illicit transactions, while criminal profits can distort competition, they can use money earned from drug trafficking to enter and compete in the legal economy, but unlike legitimate businesses, they do not need to rely entirely on lawful profits to survive.
In February 2026, Europol announced the dismantling of an international criminal network that laundered cocaine profits for Italian organized crime groups. Investigators tracked the financial movements all the way through shell companies, false invoicing and to genuine luxury investments. Drug trafficking earnings can circulate across borders and enter the legitimate economy through these means.
Additionally, violence and intimidation can undermine public trust in their government, discourage cooperation with law enforcement and make communities more vulnerable to criminal influence, and as more and more groups have a hold, competition between them can generate further violence, particularly when attempting to establish control over distribution and important trade routes.
The geopolitical question: sovereignty under pressure
Sovereignty is generally understood as territorial integrity, border control, military defence and the ability of governments to make independent decisions, but organized crime exposes one more dimension: the capacity of a state to enforce its laws, protect public institutions and prevent other actors, may be private or criminal, from taking priority over public authority.
A country does not need to lose control of its territory for its sovereignty to be tested. Taking the example of ports again, if we see it from a different angle, when a port worker is bribed or intimidated, a criminal organization gains access to infrastructure that the state is responsible for securing. When illicit money enters legitimate businesses, criminal networks benefit from economic structures that were designed to support the country's economy . When officials are compromised, decision making is misguided by criminal interests.
These activities do not automatically mean a loss of sovereignty, and it’s important to clarify that isolated corruption and systematic criminal infiltration are not the same. Corruption has existed and will most likely keep happening in several spheres, but when criminal networks repeatedly take advantage of public and private institutions, they can weaken the capacity through which sovereignty is exercised.
This is especially significant in Europe, where economic integration is an important part of prosperity, but then the same interconnected systems that allow companies to operate efficiently across countries can create opportunities for criminal networks to move goods, money and people.
As a final thought, the geopolitical concern here is not that criminal organizations will replace European governments, it is that they can gradually undermine the ability of a state to exercise its authority in specific economic and institutional spaces, while the openness that characterizes Europe is exploited.
Why does this matter?
Because organized crime does not stop at national borders, and neither do its consequences. When criminal networks exploit international trade, corrupt institutions and move illicit money through legitimate businesses, they threaten more than public security: they weaken the state's ability to enforce its laws and protect its citizens. Europe cannot address this challenge through drug seizures alone, it must also protect the economic and institutional systems that criminal organizations intend to exploit.
Comments