Mexico, Cartel Violence and the Transcontinental Criminal Network
- Laura Tatiana Pérez Molina
- 6 days ago
- 3 min read
On February 22, Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, otherwise known as “El Mencho”, the head of the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), died due to severe injuries suffered during an operation carried by Mexican forces to capture him in Jalisco, Mexico. The reaction from members of the cartel and allied organizations was immediate: roadblocks across several states, vehicles, shops burned, and flights disrupted.
CJNG is one of the most powerful criminal organizations in the Western Hemisphere. However, it is not merely a violent domestic cartel; it is a transcontinental enterprise part of global trade flows, financial systems and corridors, and unfortunately killing its leader does not dismantle that architecture.
THE GEOPOLITICS OF CARTELS
Cartels are considered Violent Non-State Actors in political science. They operate outside the control of the state and use violence as a means to achieve their goals. They vary depending on their territoriality, motivations and types of violence. Examples of Violent Non-State Actors include insurgencies, guerrillas, terrorist groups and criminal organizations.
In the case of cartels, territoriality is quite important. With more territory comes more power, greater economic gains and dominance over rivals, especially over strategic elements such as transportation routes used for trafficking. However, territory is only one part of a much bigger picture: global supply chains.
COCAINE LOGISTICS
CJNG evolved from a regional trafficking organization into a global network. When it comes to cocaine, shipments begin in the Andes (Colombia, Peru, Bolivia), where coca is cultivated. From there, the product moves through corridors to different parts of the world. The most immediate route is north to the United States and Canada through Central America, but it also moves east through West Africa.
The Gulf of Guinea has become a strategic transit corridor for Latin American cartels seeking access to European markets. Weak enforcement capacity, corruption vulnerabilities and porous coastlines make countries in the area convenient for the product to arrive. From there, drugs travel through the Sahel and across the Mediterranean into Europe.
Once in Europe, major entry ports include Antwerp (Belgium), Rotterdam (Netherlands) and Valencia (Spain), where Balkan and Italian criminal organizations often take charge of continuing the journey.
SYNTHETIC DRUGS
This market reveals an even broader dimension of this global architecture. Unlike cocaine, methamphetamine and fentanyl are not dependent on geographic conditions such as climate and altitude; they depend on chemistry.
The chemicals required for synthetic drug production are sourced to a large extent from manufacturers in Asia, particularly China and, increasingly, India. These substances are often shipped legally, as they are chemical products with legitimate uses. However, to avoid detection, they may be misdeclared, relabeled or rerouted through intermediary companies before arriving at Mexican ports in the Pacific.From there, they move to clandestine laboratories where cartel chemists transform them into methamphetamine or fentanyl pills destined primarily for the U.S. market.
This is the geopolitical layer often ignored in domestic security debates. Cartels are not isolated criminal gangs; they are actors within transnational networks that stretch from Andean coca fields to West African coastal states, from Pacific ports in Mexico to container terminals in Northern Europe.
WHAT ABOUT THE MONEY?
Cartels move their money through complex corporate structures with multiple layers, shell companies and investments, particularly in real estate.Funds also pass through correspondent banking relationships and jurisdictions. These schemes for money-laundering can extend into financial centers in the United States, Latin America, Europe and the Middle East.
In conclusion, these supply chains run across at least three continents and involve numerous intermediaries before a synthetic drug pill reaches an American city. It is bigger than one man, and the death of El Mencho is not going to bring down this entire structure. El Mencho was an important coordinator within that system, but he was not the system itself.
SO WHAT WILL BE THE CONCEQUENCES?
We are most likely going to see a violent CJNG reconfiguration and possibly fragmentation, as senior commanders struggle to secure revenue streams, territorial influence and control. We may begin to see localized spikes in violence and the rise of smaller competing factions, which could become an even bigger problem since they are harder to monitor and contain. However, synthetic drug production, transcontinental smuggling corridors and global money-laundering networks are not going to disappear.
THEN WHY DO IT?
These types of operations have clear political implications. On a domestic level, eliminating El Mencho projects state capacity and reassures the public that action is being taken. Internationally, it reinforces Mexico’s cooperation with the United States at a moment of heightened tensions over trafficking, cross-border security and sovereignty. It particularly signals to Washington that, with close cooperation, Mexico can address the threat without the need for American boots on the ground.
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