Nigeria: the jihadist threat and its expansion

Photo Credit: James Sheehan / US Army / Reuters

Since the beginning of 2026, Nigeria’s security environment has deteriorated, driven by an intensification of operations by radical Islamist groups in its northern regions. As one of the most prominent groups in the zone, the Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP) claimed two attacks on the Nigerian army in May 2026. In addition, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) or Boko Haram threaten the country, alongside other indigenous Nigerian jihadist groups, often splinters of these more important groups. Recently, in January, the Nigerian government designated a new group, the Lakurawa group, as a terrorist organization, operating mainly in the North-Eastern region.

Linked to the growing insecurity and state failure in central Sahelian states (Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali), Nigeria is on the frontline of this fight against radical Islamist groups in the region. Alongside other countries in the Horn of Africa, Abuja faces the expansion and professionalization of these radical Islamist groups, threatening the stability of the region. It also encountered a renewed interest from external actors, such as the United States, which has reinforced their diplomacy with Abuja.

Operational evolution of Jihadist groups:

In the past year, the most prominent radical Islamist groups — ISSP or JNIM — have demonstrated increasing levels of professionalization. Their use of heavier weaponry coupled with their ability to operate simultaneous operations and coordinate with other groups or insurgencies proved this trajectory. For example, JNIM has been pressuring the Malian government through the targeting of key crossroads in the country, coupled with the pragmatic use of the Tuareg rebels from the Front of Liberation of the Azawad.

Furthermore, as illustrated by the Lakurawa group recently, radical Islamist groups have been evolving along a hybrid trajectory, combining organized crime with radical Islamist dynamics. It enabled these groups to take advantage of the instability of the region, finding safe havens in porous borders and exploiting them to finance themselves. Indeed, these groups rely on smuggling, kidnapping for ransom or by territorial control — using extortion or taxation as a way to impose their governance — reinforcing the instability in the Northern part of the country.

Nigeria as a strategic prize: jihadists and external powers:

As noted earlier, radical Islamist groups rely on diverse financing mechanisms. Like the Lakurawa group, many have embraced a hybrid model, leveraging criminal activities to fund their operations while consolidating control over territory through the imposition of radical Islamist rules and the territorial embedding of their structures. Due to instabilities in the central Sahel, Nigeria appears to be a logical target for these groups, as Abuja represents the most economically important actor in the region. Moreover, they take advantage of the country’s own weaknesses, as it faces governance challenges in its northern territories.

Nonetheless, radical Islamist groups are not the only actors interested in Nigeria. In the past year, the United States has reinforced its diplomacy with Abuja to regain a strategic foothold in the region, notably through the sending of military material and a deeper military cooperation. In addition, Nigeria is among Africa’s richest countries regarding its resources, particularly oil and gas, in which American companies are major investors. Therefore, the American intervention could be seen as logical, following its interest in preserving a stable environment for its investments.

Like the United States, other countries have reinforced their presence in Nigeria. Türkiye, for instance, has deepened its defense partnership with Abuja, notably through a 2026 military agreement covering training, equipment production and broader defense cooperation. Benin, as a direct neighbor also exposed to the spillover of insecurity from the central Sahel, has likewise strengthened its bilateral cooperation with Nigeria on trade, border management and security.

Conclusion:

The emergence of new non-state actors and the constant pressure of radical Islamist groups on Nigeria’s borders seems to demonstrate a growing threat for Abuja. Already impacted by instability in the central Sahel region, the worsening of the security environment in Northern Nigeria seems to further integrate the country into the broader Sahelian conflict. While the United States or Türkiye are reinforcing their partnerships with Abuja, the real answer may lie in reviving regional security architectures, even though diplomatic fractures between ECOWAS and the Alliance of Sahel States complicate coordinated action.