Persisting tensions between the EU and the Alliance of Sahel States
- Antoine Quiquempoix

- Apr 12
- 3 min read
In a recent interview, Ibrahim Traore, leader of the junta in Burkina Faso, declared that the population should forget about democracy. A statement that may seem trivial but could raise questions on the future of the dialogue between European countries and the Alliance of Sahel State (AES). Even though the rift between both the EU and AES is deeper, democracy remains essential for Brussel. Therefore, it seems legitimate to question how the EU could possibly overcome its need to discuss with democracies when facing openly autocratic governments.
Tensions between Europe and central Sahelian states (Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso) are not recent and have been particularly critical since the three countries faced coups in 2021, 2022 and 2023. Similarly, the AES has been created after Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso left the ECOWAS, which further entrenched these countries into an authoritarian drift. As an example, Mali has dissolved political parties in 2025 and Niger reduced freedom of speech. Since then, the region has been marked by a rapprochement with Russia, China or Turkey, taking advantage of the divisions with European countries.
The roots of the tensions:
The European approach to the Sahel region is rooted in 4 pillars: Development, good governance, and internal conflict resolution; political and diplomatic action; security and the rule of law; the fight against extremist violence and against radicalization. This particular stance on Europe’s involvement in the region have been often interpreted by Sahelian states as an interference regarding internal governance. As an example, the numerous anti-French demonstrations in these countries denounced this approach, often depicted as paternalistic and inherited from the colonization.
The rapprochement with Russia, Turkey or China further entrenched the scission between European countries and the AES, as the latter disregarded what the EU looked at as governance issues. Therefore, Russia, China and Turkey pragmatically reinforced their ties with the AES countries while Europe was leaving the Sahel, in what can be seen as a reject of the regime changes in the region. Nonetheless, in the same interview led by the RTB (Burkina Radio Television), Ibrahim Traore stated that he was not opposed to anyone, as long as Burkina Faso was treated on an equal foot.
How is the situation evolving?
After Traore’s discourse, it seems that the EU is trapped between its principles and its interests. On one side, Brussels maintains its position on democracy and the respect of fundamental rights, while on the other side, it can’t deny the security issues the Sahel region is facing, that impact indirectly the Union. That is why, the EU has been rethinking its approach to the region, as the EU’s Special Representative for the Sahel advocated precisely for this in January 2026. Nonetheless, diverging interests within the EU are still important issues the Union has to face, which complicates a pragmatic action.
Therefore, it is possible to observe a real standoff between Europe and the AES, where both parties have been trying to impose their own priorities. What Traore’s discourse marks does not seem to be another rejection of European powers, but rather a reminder of the current political realities that the Union will have to face if it wants to renew the dialogue in the central Sahel region.
Conclusion:
Finally, the strained relationship between the EU and the AES demonstrates a more complex dilemma for Europe. Even though deeply attached to the rule of law and democracy, it has to face the reality of the Sahelian government that has been in power for the past years. While the AES has been able to secure and diversify its diplomatic ties with Russia, Turkey or China, the EU still struggles to renew a pragmatic dialogue in a region particularly strategic for the Union. Whether the EU will be able to assess its internal tensions and dilemmas without betraying its core values will determine its future influence in the Sahel, and the future of the cooperation with AES countries.




Comments