Russia Stays, Syria Sets the Terms

Map connecting Russia and Syria, with a naval ship and military aircraft representing Tartus and Hmeimim.

Bashar al-Assad’s government collapsed in December 2024 and almost immediately the question of Russia’s military presence in Syria became a test to Moscow’s influence.For more than a year, it was unclear whether the new Syrian authorities would expel Russia, tolerate a reduced deployment or renegotiate the relationship entirely in regards to two locations:  Tartus naval base  and Hmeimim airport that were completely under Russian control. 

The answer arrived on August 9, 2026: Russia will stay at these two locations, but under a different arrangement. The deal signed returns civilian infrastructure to Syrian management and transforms the military sections of the two sites into joint training and qualification centres.

So at the end of the day was Russia evicted? No, but describing the agreement as a normal renewal would also be incorrect.

Why Tartus and Hmeimim matter to Russia

Let’s start with the importance of these locations.

Tartus allows Russian vessels to refuel, resupply and undergo maintenance without returning all the way to home ports.This translates into supporting Russian maritime access to Libya, the Red Sea and African theatres where Russian personnel and military contractors operate. The Royal United Services Institute  described Tartus as a key logistical hub for Russian activity in Sudan and West Africa, compared to other alternative facilities in the Mediterranean that remain politically uncertain or  limited in operation.

Hmeimim, was built for Russia’s 2015 intervention the Syrian civil war, it gave Moscow an air bridge into the Middle East. From there, Russia could deploy combat aircraft, transport personnel and equipment, protect its coastal presence and sustain operations beyond Syria.

Together, Hmeimim and Tartus allowed Moscow along with the alliance with Assad to have a reliable regional military position.

Their value has increased as Russia’s wider naval options have narrowed. Turkey’s wartime enforcement of the Montreux Convention has restricted the passage of  warships through the Turkish Straits, while Ukrainian attacks have weakened Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.

Losing both Syrian facilities would have been a very significant regional setback. 

Not a victory

The memorandum is a great outcome considering the loss of Assad, but it should not be mistaken for a victory for Moscow.

It was a close call to experiencing the political humiliation of a complete expulsion from a country where it invested heavily in military intervention.

The agreement may allow Moscow to retain local relationships and some logistical access, while of course being presented domestically as a deepening in Russian-Syrian cooperation.

But the nature of the old model of presence is different.The bases were platforms for fully and autonomous Russian power projection. Under the newly announced model, they are joint facilities operating in a country whose government emphasizes publicly sovereignty and civilian control. 

Russia may still have influence, but it will have less freedom to exercise it without Syrian approval, and that is the crucial distinction. It will not be possible to have the capabilities of an independently operated air base and naval hub. 

Whether Russia can still use the sites to support deployments into Africa or sustain warships in the Mediterranean will depend on the operational protocols agreed and not simply on Russia’s will.

A shift in the balance

For Russia, Syria is no longer a dependable ally that can grant exceptional privileges in exchange for regime survival. It is a negotiating partner with its own alternatives.

Damascus has been working on re-building relations with Washington, which ended the Syria sanctions programme and removed Syria from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism. It has also deepened relations with Paris with Emmanuel Macron’s July 2026 visit, the first one by an EU head of state since Assad’s fall. 

These expanding partnerships give Damascus more leverage and reduce its dependence on Moscow. 

WHY IT MATTERS

The Tartus-Hmeimim deal represents the end of the arrangement created under Assad, it affects Russia’s ability to project military power in the Mediterranean and into Africa. It also reveals the broader shift: Damascus can now negotiate among Moscow, Washington, Paris and regional powers instead of depending on a single protector.

From another perspective, the story could also be how Syria gained influence over how Russian power can operate from its territory.