Weaponizing energy: a potential deal between Russia and Niger

Introduction:

Alarmed by recent information, the French government warned about a potential sale of Nigerien uranium to Russia. Both Moscow — and its company Rosatom — and the Nigerien junta denied such a transaction, nevertheless, it is not the first time that Russia is interested in the nuclear sector in Niger. In July 2025 already, the Russian minister of energy, accompanied by a delegation of representatives of the defence minister and giants of the uranium industry (Rosatom and Rosego), visited Niger to discuss investment opportunities in the country.

Russia’s reinforcement in the Nigerien uranium happens at a particular moment, as President Vladimir Putin announced the successful tests of a new nuclear propulsion missile (Bourevestnik), which would reinforce a certain threat perception in Europe. As well, Moscow presented multiple plans of cooperation on the civil nuclear energy in the country in the past years, offering not only the exploitation of mining sites, but also the development of the energy sector in Niger. This potential operation is thus a continuity of the Russian engagement in the region.

Why is the Nigerien uranium important?

Uranium mines in Niger represent among the biggest reserves of uranium in the world, making them particularly strategic for the military junta in place, as well as for external actors interested in such resources. Orano, a French mining company, was since 1971 exploiting uranium in Niger, as France was the main partner of the country. Since the coup in 2023, the company had to stop its exploitations, and therefore a long-lasting partnership between France and Niger. The end of this agreement is part of a broader rejection of the French and Western involvement in the region, as all three juntas in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso turned towards Russia.

The Nigerien uranium represented in 2023 15% of France’s importations, but for the EU (European Union), this amount goes up to 25%, making it particularly important for the continent. At the same time, other sources are available, mainly in central Asia, where Orano is already active. Nevertheless, shipping from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for example, are going through Russia, thus reinforcing the importance of Moscow in the international delivery of Uranium towards Europe.

In short, the Nigerien uranium is relatively strategic, both for the military junta in Niger and for Russia on a greater scale. Indeed, the military junta is able to monetize its mines in exchange for services or money. As seen in Mali or Burkina Faso, Moscow has secured strategic resources to overcome Western sanctions, and uranium might become another source of tension in the near future, especially for the EU.

What are the geopolitical issues:

Nigerien and Russian reserves of uranium account for 16.2% of the world reserves (6.7% for Niger and 9.5% for Russia), and Moscow alone is responsible for 44% of the global enrichment capacity. Therefore, Moscow holds a particularly important place on the world nuclear market. In the case where Russian companies like Rosatom or Rosego would be able to secure a deal to exploit exclusively mines in Niger, Russia would weigh significantly more on the international market. This could put a greater pressure on European countries, still dependent on Moscow regarding energy, especially with resources from the Sahel region and Central Asia.

Even though the deal remains potential, and both parties denied such an agreement, the fact that it could become a reality is already a tool for Russia to pressure the EU on strategic resources. The combination of a military presence and of agreements in the energy sector marks a greater anchorage on a multidimensional level. Nevertheless, the relative failure of the Africa Corps — a Russian private military company controlled by Moscow — in the region, shows a lack of effectiveness in the Russian involvement in the security frame of Sahelian countries. Therefore, it is possible to question whether or not the deal on a 1000t of uranium will be manageable, and if the projects on civilian nuclear energy in Niger will be realised in the near future.

In the meantime, some Western countries, such as Germany or the United States of America, are willing to come back in the region and reinforce their presence to counter the Russian influence, as well as secure strategic resources in what seems to be a geopolitical competition over energy sources.

To conclude:

The potential sale of uranium to Russia from the military junta in Niger is symptomatic of the partnership created in the past years. Moscow has endeavoured to reinforce its ties with Niger and the Sahelian countries on both military and economic levels. The deeper ties created came along with a stronger rejection of Western powers in the region, mainly France, and therefore seriously pressured  the European Union. Already dependent on Russia for energy, the possibility of a deal with Niger on uranium represents a threat for the EU’s autonomy. Finally, as the insecurity in the region is still growing, the feasibility of a delivery and of the development of new civil projects seems uncertain. Beyond the case of Niger, this raises a broader issue for the EU: how it will be able to diversify its access to critical raw materials as rival powers increasingly instrumentalise energy and critical materials as tools of geopolitical influence?