Bamako under blockade: JNIM is reinforcing its attacks in Mali across the southern regions of the country.

In the past month, Mali faced a higher number of attacks on critical trade routes across the southern regions of the country. Roads leading to the capital have been targeted by the radical Islamist group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), active in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. The group claimed to blockade the Bamako-Dakar corridor, in order to stop shipments of fuel and goods to the capital and other cities in Mali. Multiple truck drivers have been abducted, and even convoys under military escort have been attacked, resulting in the death of multiple Malian soldiers and the loss of critical resources to supply the capital in fuel. 

The efforts of the group to prevent the junta from functioning normally have increased in the past years, reinforcing its capacity to counter the state and replace it in rural areas of the country. These attacks further demonstrate JNIM’s reinforcement in Mali, and its capacity to fully block vital state resources. However, they represent a serious threat as they target important cities in southern Mali. Among the cities targeted, Kayes and Nioro du Sahel are under direct blockade, and across the Koulikoro, Segou, and Sikasso regions, JNIM has launched coordinated attacks, marking a serious expansion of their activities. 

The Malian government reacted by launching a series of drone and helicopter strikes on crucial axis in the southern regions, in an attempt to secure trade routes. This reaction displays a clear path taken by the Alliance of the Sahelian Countries (AES) in maintaining a fully repressive policy, neglecting a holistic approach that would take into consideration economic and social issues in order to diminish incentives to join radical Islamist groups and violent non-state actors.

Implications for the region:

Risks for the region are multiple. First of all, it is clear that these attacks mark a reinforcement of JNIM’s capacities, threatening the stability of Mali. The group has scaled up its capacity, showing that it is able to use heavier weapons to attack and disrupt the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) as well as the Malian economy. It further demonstrates the tactical capacity of JNIM in orienting its attack not only towards the FAMa and the government, but as well towards crucial economic sites, diminishing Mali’s credibility and sovereignty over its own territory. 

Second of all, the broader region is at risk. These attacks indicate the capacity of JNIM to strike easily in the south of the country, which could mean a reinforcement of its activities further south, and the possibility to strike across the border towards Ivory Coast and Guinea. Burkina Faso faces the same issues with JNIM, as the group is also reinforcing its attacks since the beginning of 2025. It further implies a coming wave of displaced people, who will seek security crossing the borders in Ivory Coast, Guinea and Mauritania to flee the blockades, risking destabilising the neighbouring countries.  

Third of all, Mali risks to further become a safe-heaven for radical Islamist groups, making the central Sahel region a strategic hub for these violent non-state actors. Not only the issue is critical for Mali and the sub-region, but it implies, as well, a reinforcement of immigration flows towards north Africa and the countries in the Gulf of Guinea. Around 4 million people are displaced in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger and in the neighbouring countries, with an increasing tendency of cross border flows, stressing the humanitarian aid and risking to further destabilise the region.

Finally, Mali risks facing a serious diminution of its GDP, as JNIM is able to strike further south. Indeed, the group is already using gold mines to finance its operations, and approximately 80% of Mali’s gold production is done in the Kayes region. Therefore, it wouldn’t be surprising to observe in the coming months actions targeting gold mines in this region to further diminish the state capacities. 

Conclusion:

Mali is facing a direct threat, with JNIM reinforcing its capacity to lead operations further south towards Bamako. The growing use of drones by the group and its ability to effectively block trade routes demonstrate a certain professionalisation and reinforces the threat it poses for the government. On a regional level, the group might reinforce its capacity to attack beyond the Malian borders. It also marks a failure for the AES, who’s unable to tackle the security threat seriously, as the number of attacks and displaced people keep rising. Finally, the risk of spillover to the countries of the Gulf of Guinea is serious, and the flows of displaced people in the region might destabilise further West Africa.