Europe and Great Power Politics: How Europe Is Responding?

The war in Ukraine, the “inevitable reunification” of Taiwan with China, or the intervention of the USA in Venezuela and its ambitions over Greenland marked a clear return to Great Power Politics. In what can be seen as a chaotic beginning of 2026, where the EU could place itself among these great powers, and how can it respond to it? Often considered a political dwarf, the EU has never been thought of in terms of power, but rather as a vast economic union. In this logic, the EU has been able to build the biggest trade market in the world. Nevertheless, the recent geopolitical events have shown the political weaknesses of the EU. Furthermore, the war in Ukraine, entering its 4^th year in February 2026, has proven the fundamental issues the EU is facing regarding its military stance, while remaining dependent on the American Military to defend itself. 

Although the Union has been developing its defence capacities, particularly since the return of high intensity warfare on its eastern borders, the “reality of European defence”, as recalled by French President Macron, seems far from being achieved. European strategic autonomy is also perceived as limited, especially as Trump’s administration uses guaranties of security over the old continent as powerful leverage to maintain close ties with the EU. Therefore, the status of the EU — facing an American, Russian and Chinese imperialism — is uncertain. 

Why does the EU struggles? 

One of the first issues the EU faces is its lack of common vision. The 27 member states have been struggling to unite themselves on many strategic matters, but in particular, defence is becoming a major issue. The most discussed topic among member states is the concept of “strategic autonomy,” which was developed by France, but is often not shared by Central and Eastern European countries.  Where Paris develops this concept as a freedom of action — particularly if there is a shift of attention from the USA — it is common for Central and Eastern European countries to perceive it as a potential “decoupling” from the American ally. This difference of perception already marks a point of tension between the 27 states, that further entrenches EU’s dependence on the US.

In addition, Trump’s intervention in Venezuela and renewed claims over Greenland has brought about even more distress for the Union, illustrating the asymmetries of power between the USA and the EU. Even though European countries answered to the US position, only five of them take part in the operation Endurance Arctic launched by Denmark. This modest participation highlights a persistent issue regarding collective actions along capability constraints, and symbolic regarding the stability of NATO. Given EU’s continued reliance on its American ally, several member states hedge through low-profile signalling, restrained by their dependence on US deterrence and the fear of abandonment. 

How can the EU respond? 

In its 2016 global strategy, the EU stated the need for its member states to take a greater responsibility for its security, and it has been reenacted in the strategic compass of 2024. Therefore, the future security strategy announced by Ursula Von Der Leyen might push further on this subject and propose a greater alignment of the EU countries in terms of security. In this regard, the war in Ukraine seems to be a good catalyst for European countries, mostly aligned to support Kyiv. The EU’s Military Assistance Mission to Ukraine (EUMAM UA) has shown the capabilities of the Union in terms of military training, which is encouraging for further security implementation within a European frame.

Along with the importance of the support to Ukraine, the EU demonstrated its capacity to reinforce supply chains and industrial capabilities regarding ammunition. This illustrates the EU’s ability not to act as a military power, but rather as a greater economic Union, shaping markets and incentives, and pushing them towards a greater coordination regarding the EU's industrial military complex. Nevertheless, the urgent situation in Ukraine also reinforces the pragmatic purchase of military equipment to whoever can deliver the fastest, which can challenge the industrial sovereignty of EU countries. The volatility of Trump’s administration might as well impact EU’s choices and increase its strategic autonomy in favour of its own capabilities.

Nonetheless, the EU's main weapon for great power politics remains its market. As shown by the package of sanctions on Russia since the invasion of Ukraine, the Union has the ability to weaponize its economy to pursue geopolitical goals. Even though this economic answer does not fully compensate for Europe’s military shortcoming, it can anchor the Union in Great-Power politics, as its market can be used as a strategic instrument. 

Conclusion:

Finally, the return to Great Power Politics does not doom the EU but rather exposes a reality: the EU is a hybrid geopolitical actor. As an economic giant, the Union is able to convert its strong market as a strategic leverage but still lacks military capabilities along with a political cohesion required for hard security. As long as the member states remain divided on the concept of strategic autonomy and that EU's security continues to be dependent on its American ally, there is evidence that the European answer will remain selective and cautious. Therefore, it is possible to further question whether or not the EU will be able to react to its own lack and transform its instruments to credible capabilities — the minimum condition for sustained influence in Great Power Politics.