Franco-German agreements are wavering: What to expect?

Introduction

Over the past decade, France and Germany started multiple joint programs meant to reinforce their defence capacities and build a stronger European autonomy. From the MGCS (Main Ground Combat System) in 2012, the FCAS (Future Combat Air System) in 2017, to the Eurodrone officially launched in 2022, these initiative supported by other European partners (Spain and Italy) were meant to deepen the relationship. Nevertheless, in the past years has generated mixed signals, sent by both France and Germany and seemingly compromised these projects. 

On the MGCS, German companies (KNDS Deutschland and Rheinmetall) approved the conception of a new transition tank in parallel of the leopard 2A8 already in production. This new tank would solely be a transitional solution as the joint program is supposed to equip both countries by 2040, which may be too late for Berlin. In the meantime, France is thinking of leaving the Eurodrone program, said to be “yesterday’s drone that we might have tomorrow” by General Bellanger. Finally, facing the slowness of the FCAS, Airbus ー one of the European manufacturers in charge of the project ー seems willing to pursue its own aircraft project. 

A structural issue between France and Germany?

The difficult relationship between France and Germany seems symptomatic of their respective position on defence. Where Paris values its strategic autonomy and its expeditionary capacities, Berlin is attached to a defence-driven vision and to engage via NATO. Though the war in Ukraine shook EU countries, the concept of strategic autonomy, mainly pursued by France, does not make unanimity. Indeed, Germany has been firmly attached to a pragmatic vision regarding weapons sent to Ukraine for example. This position seems to undermine the possibility to commonly reinforce European partnerships, and therefore maintain a certain dependence on the American ally.  

In addition, even though both the FCAS and the MGCS were supposed to represent “twin flagships” of the Franco-German leadership in Europe, the difficulties they face now symbolise the doubts between both countries. Manufacturers from both countries further reinforce these doubts. Dassault, the French aviation constructor, defends a strong position as one of the few constructors in Europe able to fully produce full-spectrum combat aircraft, whereas Rheinmetall holds a serious position with its experience on the leopard, which is still in production compared to the French Leclerc. Industrial tensions between manufacturers further entrench the already difficult and structural nature of Franco‑German relations.

Not a complete breakup

Nevertheless, these projects are not completely abandoned. Even though France is discussing a withdrawal from the Eurodrone, both MGCS and FCAS could still provide a framework of cooperation. Indeed, Berlin simply acknowledged the necessity for a transition battletank, which is not in opposition with the joint program. Regarding FCAS, German manufacturers proposed a change to the current programme: developing two aircraft to reflect the respective visions of both sides. Therefore, even though tensions exist between Berlin and Paris, these joint ventures could still be maintained and reinforce the European defence industry and autonomy. 

In addition, the recent geopolitical events at the beginning of 2026 have shown the necessity to invest in its own autonomy. The volatility of America as an ally, and the tensions over Greenland and NATO, could therefore lead to reinforced European partnerships, and solidify already existing programs. For example, Germany recently opened the debate with the United Kingdom and France, on a potential European nuclear deterrence, which would reduce European’s dependence for its defence on the USA. 

Conclusion:

In the end, the actual tensions between Paris and Berlin directly reflect the internal divisions of the EU. Frictions between manufacturers and differences in perceptions make cooperation slower, more fragile and frustrating for both parties. Nevertheless, the alternative ー a fragmented European market relying on the USA for its defence ー sits uneasily with both countries who have military and security ambitions. Therefore, Germany and France’s tensions mark the importance for both countries to clarify their respective postures and the terms of these partnerships, in order to propose solutions and maintain the cooperation. For now, it seems that the focus is on whether or not manufacturers of both countries will be willing to match the political ambitions of Berlin and Paris, and agree on common terms to finalize joint projects.