Somaliland: towards recognition from the USA?

Introduction:

Somaliland constitutes one of the most durable and paradoxical cases of de facto state in the contemporary international system. Former British protectorate that became independent in 1960, before unifying a few days later with former Italian Somalia, the territory in the northern region in the Horn of Africa declared its independence in 1991. Taking advantage of the civil war during this period, Somaliland has since been able to administer its territory, reinforcing reliable infrastructures and organizing several elections in the country. Even though the de facto state answers in some parts of the definition of a sovereign state (defined territory, permanent population, effective government), it remains excluded from the international concert, and its recognition raises tensions over regional stability. 

Nevertheless, in a context marked by instabilities and a certain recomposition of the world order, the territory has been recognized by Israel in December 2025, and reinforced its posture with the US in February 2026, stating to be ready to offer the exclusive access to its mineral resources as well as military bases. Its strategic position at the doors of the Bab-El-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea, as well as the rising importance of trade routes and rare earths might influence the regional dynamics and possibly impact the principles of recognition. Therefore, it is possible to question if Somaliland could become the next US base in the region.

What is Somaliland? 

As previously mentioned, Somaliland is often defined as a de facto state, which means that it answers only partially statehood criteria. Somaliland’s government has been able to reinforce its internal structures, therefore legitimizing its position locally as a rightful actor. Nevertheless, even though it has a defined territory, a permanent population and the capacity to enter in relation with other governments, Somaliland lacks a crucial criteria, recognition. This obstacle therefore introduces an important political dimension in the action of recognition which can be defined as the process of formally acknowledging the legal existence of a state or government. 

Beyond its internal achievements, Somaliland’s claim to statehood cannot be understood without taking into consideration the political dimension of recognition. Indeed, this process has also to be understood as an act shaped by interest, alliances and balance of power. In a region marked by an important competition of power, the case of Somaliland demonstrates how recognition remains deeply political. 

What is at stake for Somaliland? 

Although the recognition from Israel marks a diplomatic breakthrough for Somaliland, the country remains confronted with pressing challenges tied to regional tensions. Its economic dependence on the Ethiopian corridor, essential for Addis Ababa to access maritime trade routes, tensions with Somalia linked to recognition and the security issues with Houthis in the Red sea seem to force Somaliland to seek alternative alliances to strengthen its stability. 

The offer made to the US on a prioritized access to rare earth, essential for modern technologies, and to ports and military bases could place Somaliland as a direct counterbalance to Djibouti in the region. Furthermore, Berbera positions itself as a strategic hub for maritime trade between Europe and Asia, reinforcing its importance as a potential counterweight in a region particularly influenced by China. 

Finally, positioned as a stable anti-terrorist country located 200km away from the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, Somaliland presents itself as a reliable regional actor contrasting with Somalia’s chronic instabilities. Therefore, Berbera’s offer would enable the US to reinforce their position at a strategic location to monitor and secure the Red Sea, while winning a stable ally. 

To conclude:

Somaliland’s trajectory reveals the importance of state recognition, even though it has fulfilled statehood criteria for over three decades. The geopolitical transaction offered to the US seems to constitute a win-win exchange where Berbera wins recognition from a security council permanent member, while Washington secures access to strategic resources and infrastructures in a relatively unstable region. Yet, this bilateral transaction, if achieved, could shake the regional balance of power. A US recognition could counter China’s influence in Djibouti while emboldening Ethiopia's pivot away from Somalia, and potentially reshaping alliances in the region. Finally, such rapprochement with strategically located African partners follows recent US deals with Nigeria or the Democratic Republic of Congo over security and access to natural resources, although without the recognition precedent Somaliland seeks.