The Geopolitics of Precision Weapons: How Missiles and Military Supply Shape Strategic Power

Over the course of the war in Ukraine and now with the conflict in Iran and the broader region, news coverage has been filled with discussions about drones, missiles, their range, destructive power, and cost. Yet what is often missing from public discussions is that these weapons not only have a direct outcome on the battlefield, but there are even deeper implications:they define what strategic options a country actually has. A state that is capable of striking its adversaries thousands of kilometers away, defending its cities from missile attacks, or sustaining a prolonged war through production holds significantly more political leverage than one that cannot. The ongoing conflicts involving Iran, Israel, the United States, Russia, Ukraine shape not only how wars are fought, but also how they are negotiated, escalated, or avoided altogether. That’s why in this article I’ll go over the capabilities, supply, and industrial dimension.

Capabilities - Weapons Create Strategic Options and shape decision making

Having certain types of weapons changes the strategic calculus of a state. Long-range missiles, air defense systems, and drones of course will firstly expand the range of actions available to governments which is something to take into consideration when contemplating the idea of getting into conflict with them. Iran offers a clear example, over the past two decades, Tehran has invested heavily in ballistic missile development, creating one of the largest missile arsenals in the Middle East. Many of these missiles can reach targets across the region, including Israel and U.S. military bases. This capability transformed Iran’s geopolitical position. Even without achieving nuclear weapons capability, Tehran can threaten regional adversaries with large-scale missiles. After the U.S.–Israeli strike against Iranian military infrastructure on 28 February 2026, Iran responded with large-scale missile and drone attacks that were launched not only toward Israel but also toward U.S. bases and allied infrastructure in countries such as Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. 

Among the most significant systems are the Shahab-3 and Ghadr-110 medium-range ballistic missiles, both of which have ranges of roughly 1,300 to 2,000 kilometers, allowing Iran to reach Israeli territory from within Iran itself. Iran has also developed newer systems such as the Emad, an improved version of the Shahab-3 with greater accuracy, and the Sejjil, a solid-fuel ballistic missile that can be launched more rapidly and is harder to detect before launch.

In addition to ballistic missiles, Iran increasingly relies on long-range drones and cruise missiles. Systems like the Shahed-136 loitering munition often called the “suicide drone” have been used extensively by Iranian forces and their partners. These drones are relatively inexpensive and can be launched in large numbers, allowing them to overwhelm air defense systems through saturation attacks.

Possessing such capabilities does not mean Iran can defeat Israel or the United States in a conventional war, but it dramatically complicates the strategic calculations nonetheless. For instance, early in the conflict, U.S. President Donald Trump suggested that the confrontation with Iran would be brief and decisive, expecting that U.S. and Israeli military superiority would neutralize Iran’s ability to respond. Yet weeks into the conflict, Iranian missile and drone attacks continue to target Israeli territory and U.S. military installations and allies across the region. The persistence of these attacks highlights that Iran’s missile arsenal allows it to sustain retaliation with the ability to continue launching strikes without troop deployments. Even when many of these weapons are intercepted by Israel’s layered missile defense systems, including Arrow-3, David’s Sling, and Iron Dome, the volume of attacks forces Israel and its allies to remain on constant defensive alert and expend costly interceptor missiles.

As a result, the conflict has proven more difficult to quickly contain than many policymakers initially expected. Iran’s missile capabilities do not allow it to defeat Israel or the United States right out of the bat, but they enable Tehran to prolong the confrontation, impose economic and military costs, and maintain escalation options. From the geopolitical terms, this ability to sustain pressure transforms missiles from simple weapons into tools of strategic endurance.

The cost-exchange ratio

Another crucial factor is what military analysts call the cost-exchange ratio: the price of offensive weapons compared to the systems used to defend against them, this imbalance has become particularly visible in the growing use of drones and loitering munitions. Low-cost drones can cost tens of thousands of dollars to produce, while the missiles required to intercept them may cost millions. Defending against Iranian drone attacks, for instance, can require interceptor missiles such as the Patriot PAC-3, which can cost roughly $3–4 million per shot, while the attacking Shahed-136 drones used by Iran and its partners are estimated to cost between $20,000 and $50,000. The economic imbalance is striking, this means that  even when defensive systems successfully intercept incoming drones, the defender will still lose financially., a country may spend millions of dollars to destroy weapons that cost only a fraction of that amount to produce.

This has become a growing concern not only among military planners but also among policymakers and the broader public. Especially for the United States, analysts and commentators have increasingly questioned whether using expensive interceptor missiles to counter large numbers of cheap drones is sustainable in prolonged conflicts. The debate started after Iran’s large-scale missile and drone attack on Israel in April 2024, when Israel and its allies were forced to intercept hundreds of incoming projectiles in a single night, expending large numbers of costly interceptors. Although the defense was marked as a success since the attack was neutralized, the event highlighted the enormous financial and logistical burden of maintaining such defenses.

This strategy is called “precise mass” a strategy that relies on large numbers of relatively cheap but accurate weapons to overwhelm more sophisticated defense systems. Instead of relying exclusively on expensive platforms such as fighter jets or cruise missiles, states are increasingly deploying swarms of drones, loitering munitions, and relatively inexpensive ballistic missiles that can saturate defenses through volume.

Even the most advanced weapons are useless if they cannot be produced in sufficient quantities. The war in Ukraine has highlighted the importance of defense industrial capacity in modern conflicts. Russia, for example, has significantly expanded its wartime production. Artillery shell output increased from roughly 250,000 rounds in 2022 to around 1.3 million rounds in 2024, while production of 9M723 ballistic missiles used in the Iskander system rose from approximately 250 units in 2023 to more than 700 in 2024. These numbers show that Moscow has adapted its economy to sustain a long war. Even after suffering significant battlefield losses estimated at more than one million casualties since the start of the invasion, Russia has been able to continue its military campaign largely because it can still produce weapons, replenish ammunition, and mobilize industrial resources.

Industrial capacity is equally important for defensive systems. Missile defense interceptors, meaning the missiles used to shoot down incoming rockets, drones, or ballistic missiles, are extremely expensive and produced in relatively limited quantities. Recent events in the Middle East have highlighted this vulnerability. During the large-scale Iranian missile and drone attacks against Israel and U.S. positions in the region, the United States reportedly used more than 150 THAAD interceptor missiles in defensive operations and military planners worry that prolonged high-intensity conflicts could rapidly deplete available stockpiles  because these interceptors are complex systems that take months or years to produce.  As of 2024, the United States was producing roughly 42 PAC-3 Patriot interceptor missiles per month and around 1,167 HIMARS rockets, numbers that are relatively modest when compared to the potential consumption rates in large-scale conflicts. With simultaneous crises occurring, maintaining sufficient interceptor supplies could become extremely difficult even for the world’s most advanced military and will eventually undermine the defense capabilities.

Where Weapons Are Built Matters

As a final note, it is important to mention also that another key dimension of the geopolitics of defense systems is where weapons are produced and who supplies them. Modern military equipment depends on complex global supply chains that involve advanced electronics, specialized materials, precision manufacturing, and high-tech components. Countries that lack these capabilities must rely on external partners, and this reliance often creates deeper geopolitical relationships.

Russia’s wartime production illustrates this dynamic. Despite heavy Western sanctions, Moscow has been able to sustain aspects of its defense industry in part through foreign assistance. China has supplied components including machine tools, microelectronics, and sensors that help support Russian missile, drone, and military equipment production. Such actions do not represent complete weapons systems exchange but provide critical inputs that enable continued manufacturing.

At the same time, the defense relationship between Russia and Iran has evolved during the Ukraine war. In the early phases of the conflict, Iran supplied Russia with large numbers of Shahed-136 loitering munitions, which Russia used in attacks against Ukrainian infrastructure. Over time, however, the relationship became more reciprocal and Russia began transferring military technology and equipment to Iran, including aircraft, helicopters, and advanced air defense systems as part of a growing strategic partnership.

These exchanges demonstrate that arms production and supply networks are themselves geopolitical instruments. Defense cooperation deepens strategic ties between states, shapes future alignments, and will be more elements to take into consideration when doing the strategic calculations. Countries that rely on external suppliers for critical weapons systems may find their military capabilities constrained by the political decisions of their partners.

Why It Matters

Understanding the geopolitics of weapons is essential for understanding today’s conflicts. The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East are also contests between industrial systems, technology, and production capacities. Missiles, drones, and air defenses determine not just how battles are fought but who can threaten escalation, who can sustain a war, and who ultimately holds leverage in negotiations. In the emerging global order, the balance of power will depend less and less on diplomacy or alliances but on who can build, supply, and sustain the weapons of modern war.

Bibliography

1. Reuters, What Are Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities? https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/what-are-irans-ballistic-missile-capabilities-2026-02-26/ 

2. Council Of Foreign relations, First Ukraine, Now Iran: A New Era of Drone Warfare Takes Hold https://www.cfr.org/articles/the-new-era-of-drone-warfare-takes-root-in-iran 

3. Wes Rumbaugh, The Depleting Missile Defense Interceptor Inventory, CSIS. https://www.csis.org/analysis/depleting-missile-defense-interceptor-inventory 

Seth G. Jones & Riley McCabe, Russia’s Grinding War in Ukraine, CSIS. https://www.csis.org/podcasts/audio-briefs/russias-grinding-war-ukraine-audio-brief-seth-g-jones-and-riley-mccabe