Rearming Europe: the end of an era?

(Nikkei montage/Source photos by Reuters

Introduction:

The invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked the return of war on the old continent and demonstrated the need for NATO countries to finally reach the goal of 2% of their GDP in military expenditures. Between 2020 and 2024, Europe accounted for 28.1% of the global arms imports, compared to only 11% between 2015 and 2019. As the war keeps raging in Ukraine, European countries maintain their efforts to rearm themselves, in a clear shift back towards realist security logics. 

At the same time, the rearmament of Europe benefits certain companies, especially across the Atlantic. Since the beginning of the invasion, multiple orders for American F-35 have been placed in Europe, competing with Sweden and France — with the Gripen and the Rafale, respectively.  On the ground, the German company Rheinmetall has grown significantly, producing and exporting the Leopard tank, even though multiple Eastern European countries remain dependent on the American ally for the procurement of armoured vehicles. 

Where is Europe leaning?

Across Europe, certain tendencies can be observed. On one side, some European countries rely on, or try to build, their strategic autonomy. France is probably the best example, as its defence industry supplies its armed forces directly, with the Rafale and other systems such as the CEASAR howitzer, which is active in Ukraine. Other countries like Sweden, Spain or Austria are able either to produce their own equipment or to rely on other European countries for their forces, reinforcing their attachment to a European Defence ecosystem. 

On a similar basis, Germany and Italy can also rely on serious defence industries, with Rheinmetall or Leonardo as important companies for both countries. Nevertheless, they remain closely tied to the United States and pursue a more hybrid military development, building both future projects with European countries — such as the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) or the Eurodrone — and maintaining important ties with the American defence industry. 

On the other side, other European countries rely on a strongly integrated Atlanticism, where the United States remains the main ally when it comes to defence. Within Europe, 13 countries have ordered, and some have already received the F-35, therefore reinforcing its importance as a standard platform within NATO. Air-defence (Patriot), armoured vehicles and military technologies also represent significant purchases for these countries, which implies a further dependence on the American defence industry.

These tendencies further demonstrate the political fracture over defence in Europe. Joint projects such as the FCAS or the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) represent points of tension between the different countries involved. France, Germany, and their respective defence companies are facing serious challenges agreeing on common programs that will benefit both industrial complexes. Similarly, European states have different needs in terms of defence, which implies multiple strategies and therefore creates a rearmament in dispersed order. 

What to expect for the European Defence?

As the United States maintains a hegemonic position as the main defence supplier through NATO, most European countries align themselves with Washington, locking themselves into a strong dependency. Therefore, it seems that Europe will maintain a high degree of dependence on its military. Nevertheless, the war in Ukraine has also reinforced Europe’s role as one of the main suppliers of weapons in the war. 

Indeed, Donald Trump’s position and the reduced political priority given to supporting Ukraine have already diminished the reliability of US assistance, therefore pressuring the EU to replace Washington. This could benefit both European states and the United States, as it means a strengthening of the EU capacities in the chain of production (mainly of shells, artillery systems and tanks) and therefore a reinforcement in NATO’s capacities that has been requested by Trump. 

In other words, while most of European states remain structurally dependant on the American ally, the rearmament of Europe also moves away the transatlantic relationship from a one-sided dependency towards a form of asymmetrical interdependence, in which European countries play a deeper and more strategic role within the Alliance.

To conclude:

The actual rearmament of Europe confirms a certain paradox. On the one hand, the war in Ukraine has forced the European states to reinforce their position and revive their industries that have been neglected over the past decades. On the other hand, this rearmament mainly took place within an Atlantic framework, through massive orders of American materials that consolidated the United States as Europe’s main security provider. 

The main question now will remain the political readiness for European states, either to move forward towards common military projects with one voice or remain somehow dependent on the American ally for their security.