Would China’s EV Dominance Spark EU Securitisation?

BYD operates its own fleet to support the large-scale export of its EVs. Photo retrieved from the official website of Shenzhen government.

Chinese EVs are taking over Europe’s streets. BYD overtakes Tesla in the European market selling three times as many vehicles as in August 2024 and surpassing Tesla for the second consecutive month, with a market share of 1.3% compared to Tesla’s 1.2%, whose sales fell 36.6%. SAIC Motor, another Chinese brand, saw sales rise 59.4%, reaching a year-to-date market share of 1.9% and ranking as the tenth best-selling brand in the EU. 

While Scandinavian countries embraced Chinese-made Yutong buses in public transportation, security concerns soon emerged. Hundreds of Chinese electric buses in Denmark were found to have vulnerabilities that could allow them to be remotely deactivated. Norwegian authorities which deployed the same bus, discovered that the Yutong bus supplier had remote access for software updates and diagnostics to the vehicles’ control systems—a capability that could potentially be exploited to affect buses while in transit. 

Similar security concerns regarding Chinese technology arose just five years ago, during Trump’s first administration. This led several European countries—including the Czech Republic —to sign a joint declaration in 2020, boycotting the use of Huawei’s 5G network equipment. Yet the saga appears to have faded from memory when the seemingly security risk comes back in another form. Are Europe’s principles of value-based conditionality being compromised by the practical lure of affordable Chinese EVs? 

Notably, under its social market economy, China maintains tight control over its companies, using them as instruments of national economic strategy. According to a study from Kiel Institute, China provides extensive subsidies to its domestic industries, especially in green technology sectors such as electric vehicles, wind turbines, and photovoltaic systems. These subsidies are estimated to be three to nine times higher than those offered in major OECD economies like the United States or Germany. 

One of the biggest beneficiaries is electric car maker BYD, whose direct government support surged from EUR 220 million in 2020 to EUR 2.1 billion in 2022, rising from 1.1% to 3.5% of its revenue. Beyond direct aid, BYD gains additional advantages through lower battery input costs and generous consumer purchase incentives, giving it a strong competitive position over domestic rivals like GAC and foreign producers such as Tesla and Volkswagen. Subsidization is pervasive across China’s economy, with more than 99% of listed firms receiving government support in 2022. These measures have accelerated China’s domestic industrial expansion and boosted its growing presence in EU markets.

China’s electric vehicle industry is already dominant and is set to grow even further. Firms like BYD, have expanded explosively and now even operate their own shipping fleets to export inexpensive EVs worldwide, particularly to the Global South. For Europe, the challenge is not simply choosing the “lesser evil,” but ensuring that technologically competitive products do not compromise security or regulatory standards. Securitisation through stricter monitoring, quality control, and clear oversight of software and data access is therefore essential. While tariffs are an option, they risk triggering Chinese retaliation at a time when the EU is already grappling with economic instability, high debt, and political fragmentation. Thus, reinforcing regulatory safeguards—rather than escalating a subsidy or tariff war—may be the most realistic path forward.